Abstract. In this short paper, using category theory, we argue that logical rules can be seen as fractions and logics as limit sketches.
INTRODUCTION
This short paper relies on a talk given at the Universal Logic 2018 conference, in the Category and Logic workshop organised by Peter Arndt. Quoted from the home page of Universal Logic:
"Universal logic is a general theory of logical structures. Universal logic is not a new logic, it is a way of unifying the multiplicity of logics by developing general tools and concepts that can be applied to all logics."
In this paper, using category theory, we argue that logical rules can be seen as fractions and logics as limit sketches, with the hope that these tools and concepts can be applied to many kinds of logics. A detailed presentation, with additional examples, can be found in [7, 8, 9, 10] . The importance of categorical fractions for proofs and computations was recognised independently in [11] . For rules, it is a fact that logical rules are written as fractions H C , with the conclusion as "denominator", and we argue that actually logical rules are fractions C H , with the hypothesis as denominator. For a logic, first we define the theories (i.e., the families of formulas which are closed under application of the rules) as the realisations of a sketch E T where rules appear as arrows. Then we derive from E T a second sketch E S and a morphism σ : E S → E T , such that the specifications (i.e., all the families of formulas) are the realisations of E S and the rules are fractions with respect to σ. An application to computational effects is mentioned at the end of this paper, this subject is developed in [12, 13, 14, 15] . Here are some historical and recommended references for: categories of fractions [1, 2] , sketches [3, 4] and locally presentable categories [5, 6] . In this short paper we omit many technical issues, typically issues related to size, choice, bicategories, etc.
I -FRACTIONS

Categorical fractions.
Given two categories S, T and a functor
We will use dashed arrows for representing "both" (right):
• a localisation if it adds inverses for some morphisms in S;
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• a reflector if T is a full subcategory of S and F is left adjoint to inclusion:
Then this adjunction is called a reflection and this is denoted:
Thus, (usual) fractions are categorical fractions, with S = Mod(Z) the category of modules over the integers, T = Vect(Q) the category of vector spaces over the rationals, and F : Mod(Z) → Vect(Q) the extension of scalars:
F (V ) = Q ⊗ V Then F (Z) = Q and the integer 4 non-invertible in Z becomes the rational 4 invertible in Q.
Logic, specifications, theories (informally).
The following notions will be defined in the next sections. Given a logic, with its formulas and rules, we say that:
• a specification S is a family of formulas;
• a theory T is a family of formulas which is closed under application of the rules.
Let us assume the existence of:
• a category S of specifications • a category T of theories • and a generating functor F : S → T such that F (S) is the family of formulas (or theorems) deduced from the formulas (or axioms) in S.
Then a logical rule is a categorical fraction wrt F .
Example: the logical rule p p⇒(Modus Ponens).
On specifications (left), on theories (middle), and both (right):
Indeed, when modus ponens is a rule of the logic, let S = {p, p ⇒ q}, then F (S) = {p, p ⇒ q, q, ...}: S is a specification that does not contain q while F (S) is a theory that contains q.
To sum up (I): Logical rules as fractions.
More precisely, a logical rule H C is a fraction c h : "the hypothesis becomes invertible".
II -SKETCHES
Warning.
In this talk, sketch always means limit sketch.
Sketches and their realisations.
A sketch E is a presentation for a category with limits E. It is made of:
• objects, • "morphisms" with only "some" identities and composition, • and "limits" with only "some" associated tuples, which become actual objects, morphisms and limits in E. We will use dotted arrows for denoting projections in limits. A realisation R of a sketch E is a set-valued model of E: it maps each object, morphism and limit in E to a set, function and limit in Set. Equivalently, a realisation R of E is a limit-preserving functor R : E → Set. Morphisms of realisations are "natural transformations" and Real(E) denotes the category of realisations of E.
The category Real(E) is a kind of generalised presheaf.
• A linear sketch E has only objects and morphisms (no limit); then Real(E) = Func(E, Set) is a presheaf category.
is the category of directed graphs.
• In general, for a [limit] sketch E, Real(E) is a locally presentable category.
) is the category of magmas.
Remark. "Many" properties of presheaves are still valid for locally presentable categories.
Logics as sketches. We argue that it is possible to define a logic as a sketch. This will provide a very simple and very abstract algebraic proposal for "unifying the multiplicity of logics", or at least part of this multiplicity.
Example: sketch for Modus Ponens. As a basic example, starting from a logic with Modus Ponens Log MP , let us build the corresponding sketch E T,MP . The logic Log MP is such that:
• The syntactic entities are the formulas (Form) and theorems (Theo), and each theorem is a formula.
• There are two rules: the formation rule (IM ) states that if p and q are formulas then p ⇒ q is a formula while the deduction rule (M P ) ensures that if p and p ⇒ q are theorems then q is a theorem.
A sketch E T,MP is now built in three steps.
• First, here is a sketch for the syntactic entities (where the arrow G G G G stands for a monomorphism, which is a kind of limit). A realisation R of this sketch is made of a set of formulas R(Form) and a set of theorems R(Theo), with R(Theo) ⊆ R(Form).
• Then, here is a sketch for the formation rule (IM ), where the limits mean that C IM = Form and H IM = Form 2 . A realisation R of this sketch is made of a set of formulas R(Form), the sets R(C IM ) = R(Form) and R(H IM ) = R(Form)
2 , and a function R(c IM ) :
• And finally here is (a simplified version of) the sketch E T,MP , where the limits mean that C MP = Theo and that H MP is "essentially" Theo 2 . Drawing the precise limit diagram for H MP is left as an exercice. It must be such that R(H MP
To sum up (II): Logical theories as realisations of a sketch. If we define a logic as a sketch E T , then the category of theories is the category of realisations T = Real(E T ). At this point, we might define a model of a theory T in a theory D as an arrow M : T → D in T and a rule as an arrow c : H → C in E T . However, this point of view is far from satisfactory, mainly because there is no notion of specification. This is solved in Part (III), where in addition we recover the fact that rules are fractions, as in Part (I).
III -SKETCHES and FRACTIONS
Morphisms of sketches.
A morphism of sketches is a generalised functor: it maps objects, morphisms and limits to objects, morphisms and limits. Each morphism of sketches σ : E 1 → E 2 induces a functor G : Real(E 2 ) → Real(E 1 ) by mapping each realisation R 2 of E 2 to the realisation R 2 • σ of E 1 .
Theorem. [3] . The functor G associated to σ has a left adjoint.
Real(E 1 )
This means that each realisation of E 1 generates a realisation of E 2 . 
Cycles.
A "cycle" in a sketch E is defined by considering that projections are oriented both sides.
Example.
There is a cycle in the sketch for the formation rule (IM ) p, q : Form p ⇒ q : Form .
• Note: because of cycle " ", in a theory T for ALL pairs of formulas (p, q) there is a formula p ⇒ q.
• Required: in a specification S for SOME chosen pairs of formulas (p, q) there is a formula p ⇒ q.
Breaking cycles.
Theorem. [7] . Cycles in a sketch can be broken "in a reasonable way". The key point is to make some arrows partial :
By breaking the cycles in E T we get a sketch E S and a morphism called a localiser
such that the corresponding adjunction is a reflection.
Real(E
S ) = S F G G ⊤ G G T = Real(E T ) ⊇ full s s
Definitions.
A diagrammatic logic is a sketch E T . By breaking the cycles in E T one gets a localiser σ : E S → E T , thus a reflector F : S → T.
• the category of theories is T = Real(E T ),
• the category of specifications is S = Real(E S ), • the theory generated by a specification S is F (S),
These definitions can be illustrated as follows, using the Yoneda contravariant embedding Y :
Set
Note that, thanks to Y, a rule can also be seen as a fraction in S wrt F which is in the image of Y. Then a proof is any fraction in S wrt F , and the density property of Y (as expressed below) ensures that proofs are built from rules.
About the Yoneda contravariant embedding. The embedding Y : E op → Real(E) is "nearly as nice" for locally presentable categories as for presheaves:
The category Real(E) has all colimits (like presheaves) but they cannot be computed sortwise (unlike presheaves). This last property can be read as negative: "computing colimits is not easy" or as positive: "a large amount of theorems can be derived from a small amount of axioms".
Example: breaking the cycle for rule (IM). First in sketches: adding a rule is a morphism:
Now in realisations:
{p, q} {r} → {p, q, r}
we get the fraction: {p, q, p ⇒ q}
Morphisms of theories are presented by fractions of specifications.
• A specification S in S is a presentation for the theory T = F (S) in T • A morphism s : S → S ′ in S is a presentation for the morphism F (s) :
In this way one gets SOME morphisms t :
Example. Every ring is a monoid.
• A fraction
In this way one gets ALL morphisms t :
Example. Every boolean algebra is a ring.
Finiteness issues.
It is a fact that every book, program, proof,... is finite, but logical theories are usually infinite.
Let us say that a realization R of a finite sketch E is finite if the set R(X) is finite for each X in E. For a diagrammatic logic, when the sketch E T is finite then:
• the sketch E S is finite,
• the realisation Y(X) is finite for each X in E S ,
• and the hypothesis and conclusion of each rule are finite specifications.
To sum up (III): Logics as sketches and rules as fractions.
A diagrammatic logic is a sketch, and by breaking the cycles in this sketch one gets a localiser (between sketches), thus a reflector (between categories of realisations). This provides a simple and abstract framework for defining the notions of theories, specifications, models, and rules as fractions. Then morphisms of diagrammatic logics are "of course" defined as fractions of sketches.
IV -Application: COMPUTATIONAL EFFECTS
The definition of a diagrammatic logic has been motivated by the study of imperative and object-oriented features in computer languages. Such features, called computational effects, can be seen from various points of view, corresponding to various logics related by non-trivial morphisms. We have built logics for reasoning about such programs without departing from their imperative or object-oriented flavour, with implementations in the Coq proof-assistant. Here is a toy example of this application.
The state effect in object-oriented programming. Let us consider the following piece of C++ code, for dealing with toy bank accounts:
Class BankAccount {... int balance (void) const ; void deposit (int) ; ...} Our goal is to associate to this piece of code a "quasi-equational" specification. Here are three proposals.
• The apparent specification:
Here the object-oriented flavour is preserved BUT the intended interpretation is not a model.
• The explicit specification:
balance : state → int deposit : int × state → state Here the intended interpretation is a model BUT the object-oriented flavour is not preserved.
• decorated specification: balance a : void → int deposit m : int → void where the decorations (superscripts) are: m for modifiers (methods) a for accessors ("const" methods) Here the intended interpretation is a model AND the object-oriented flavour is preserved.
These three specifications live in three different diagrammatic logics, related by morphisms: a morphism from the decorated logic to the apparent logic, that forgets the decorations, and a morphism from the decorated logic to the explicit logic, that expands the code so as to make the semantics explicit. Our proofs lie in the decorated logic. 
CONCLUSION
We propose an abstract algebraic framework for logic.
• A simple framework: -A diagrammatic logic is a sketch.
-A diagrammatic logical rule is a fraction.
• A homogeneous framework:
"the logic of logics is a logic".
• A category of logics: morphisms of logics are fractions of sketches.
